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ESSAY: PRESIDENT BUSH'S MILITARY ORDER: DETENTION,
TREATMENT, AND TRIAL OF CERTAIN NON-CITIZENS IN THE WAR
AGAINST TERRORISM

Gregory P. Noone*
Not a day goes by without a reminder of the horrors of September 11,
2001. America is united in its desire to hold accountable those responsible
for those crimes. Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist organization
have been identified as the perpetrators of the attacks. On November 13,
2001, President George W. Bush added to the arsenal of prosecutorial
options by signing the Military Order regarding the Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.' It is clear
that the President has the authority to establish such tribunals and prescribe
their rules. The President's authority resides in his Constitutional role as
Commander-in-Chief, Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), which is federal law passed by Congress, and legal
precedent.2
This essay is limited to an examination of the Military Order of
November 13th and is not a summary of opposing views. It will not
attempt to point out every issue that may be contrary to standard U.S.
justice practices, address the somewhat related "detainee-prisoner of war"
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1 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57831-57836 (The President Nov. 16,
2001).
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debate, or confront issues of the law of war that have been raised in the last
several months.
CONCERNS

This author's primary concern is that the military commissions are
conducted in a fundamentally fair way because the United States is a
principled nation dedicated to the rule of law. The forums must be
conducted fairly, impartially, and with transparency so that justice is done
and seen to be done. Military commissions cannot be perceived as
shortcuts to obtaining convictions. Ultimately, if the commissions are seen
as less than evenhanded, it could actually damage the war against terrorism
by de-legitimizing American efforts and, potentially, its cause. The United
States must not allow the legal use of U.S. presidential authority to be
distorted and instead, used to breed the next generation of suicide bombers.
Another concern with the use of military commissions is whether the U.S.
will lose its high ground if a U.S. citizen is detained and tried overseas by a
"military court." Is the United States willing to make that trade off?
Military commissions are not the same as courts-martial under the
U.S. military justice system. Military lawyers understandably take great
pride in the military judicial system. It is not perfect - no system is - but
most familiar with the system agree that if they were accused of a crime
they did not commit, they would want to be sent to a U.S. military courtmartial. The jury (or panel members) for a court-martial is one of the most
experienced, worldly, intelligent, and vigilant in the American justice
system. There is no reason to believe a military commission panel drawn
from the U.S. Armed Forces would be anything less.
Section 4 of the Military Order describes the Authority of the
Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials of Individuals Subject to this Order.
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is tasked with promulgating the
regulations by which the military commissions will abide. 3 Many, if not
all, of the issues being raised in this essay and elsewhere, can ultimately be
remedied by the Department of Defense (DOD) rules for procedure and
evidence. With that said, an appropriate point of departure in developing
these rules would logically be the military justice system. For instance, any
commission's panel should include at least five members, which would be
consistent with the minimum requirement for the most serious of courtsmartial - the general court-martial. If these rules are seen as fair, they will
mollify the international community and can legitimately remedy some of
the Military Order's shortcomings and at times overly broad text. On the
other hand, if the regulations simply mirror the Order's language, they will
3 This essay was written prior to the promulgation of the Department of Defense
Military Commission Order No. 1 on March 21, 2002 entitled "Procedures for Trials by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism"
(DoD MCO No. 1, March 21, 2002).
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not be able to perform their essential clarifying role and will likely be of
little help in winning any hearts and minds at home or abroad.
EVIDENCE AND FORUMS

Some maintain that the existence of an effective and functioning courtmartial system vitiates the need for military commissions. Others disagree
and argue that military commissions are necessary, primarily because of the
difficulty with evidence. It would be difficult to maintain any chain of
custody for evidence discovered on the "battlefield," and hearsay evidence
would probably be even more difficult because many eyewitnesses may be
afraid to testify against a worldwide terrorist organization such as al Qaeda.
A suppression hearing is as serious at a court-martial as any other U.S.
forum. The Military Rules of Evidence essentially mirror the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The military judges fiercely guard their independence, and
there is no wink and nod to the government counsel with respect to the
admissibility of evidence.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the Military Order allows for the admission of
evidence that has "probative value to a reasonable person."
The
admissibility of evidence is a cornerstone of the American judicial system
that sets the U.S. apart from the rest of the world. There must be clear rules
of evidence, and there should be at least one judge advocate with military
judge experience advising the commission. It must be evident that the rules
do not change whenever it suits the United States.
Others argue that the best forum for al Qaeda members is an ad hoc
international tribunal, similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). But these contrary viewpoints would agree that American
due process standards far exceed internationally accepted standards. Both
the ICTY and the ICTR admit hearsay evidence when it is deemed relevant
and reliable, as do many European criminal courts. There is no doubt that
the lesser international standard with regard to the admissibility of evidence
would be a more powerful tool for these military commissions than the
more stringent American standard.
Another difficulty with a court-martial as a forum to prosecute al
Qaeda members is that it could only address violations of the law of war in
accordance with Article 18 of the UCMJ, which provides for jurisdiction
over non-U.S. service members for such offenses. Courts-martial could not
assimilate any of the federal anti-terrorist legislation, such as the murder or
kidnapping of a U.S. national abroad. In all likelihood, it would take an act
of Congress to adapt these Title 18 statutes, which are used in the U.S.
federal courts to prosecute terrorists, for use at a court-martial. In contrast,
the military commissions are specifically designed to cover international
terrorism and its related offenses.
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FINDINGS AND SENTENCING

Sections 4 (c)(6) and 4 (c)(7) of the Order state that only a two-thirds
vote is required for conviction and for sentencing. Many jurisdictions in
the United States and around the world do not require unanimous decisions.
In fact, U.S. courts-martial under the UCMJ require a two-thirds vote of the
panel (i.e. jury) in order to convict an accused in the findings phase of a
court-martial. A two-thirds vote in the sentencing phase is required as well.
However, these provisions are problematic with respect to the death
penalty, which is an obvious sticking point with the United States'
European allies, as well as others. The U.S. military has had difficulty
obtaining custody over U.S. service members accused of murders in
Europe, despite the jurisdiction provisions of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. Our allies have demanded assurances that the charges will not
be referred as a capital offense (i.e. death as a possible punishment). This
issue has also been at the core of civilian extradition problems as well.
However, a U.S. court-martial that is referred as a capital case under
the UCMJ requires a unanimous vote of the panel (i.e. jury) during the
findings phase of the trial in order to continue the possibility of a death
sentence. Then, during the sentencing phase, the court-martial members
must again vote unanimously for the sentence of death. If just one member
does not vote for death, the sentence is automatically adjudged as life in
prison. The military commissions should follow the same procedures.
Lastly, the "present at the time of the vote" language should not have
been included in the Military Order because it may suggest to some that the
commissions are not fully sensitive to the gravity of their responsibility.
The DOD rules should make it clear that when people are assigned to a
commission, this service is their primary duty, and an extremely serious
one, just as it is in a court-martial. However, a provision in the rules to
excuse a member for extraordinary circumstances would be reasonable.
DETENTION, CLOSED COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS, AND APPELLATE
REVIEW

Section 3 of the Military Order details the Detention Authority of the
Secretary of Defense and re-affirms any detainee's basic human rights.
However, there are two troubling omissions in this section. First, it is
imperative that detained persons have a stated right to an attorney. Second,
in all U.S. jurisdictions, there is a requirement to appear before a magistrate
in a reasonable period of time (usually one to seven days) after being
detained. Releasing a suspect before obtaining all evidence against them is
a law enforcement nightmare, nevertheless, there must be some type of
preliminary hearing at a "reasonable" point in the process. However, in
light of the circumstances, "reasonable" certainly does not mean one week,
but a hearing does need to be conducted - preferably earlier rather than
later - in order to justify detention.
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The Order's Section 4 (c)(4) allows the military commissions to limit
access or close the courts when it is necessary for the protection of
classified information. This is not unreasonable and, in fact, is done in
national security cases regularly, both here and abroad. However, a closed
court needs to be a legitimate exception rather than the rule.
Section 4 (c)(8) describes the appellate review process as including the
president or SECDEF. The military has an appellate review process that is
effective and ultimately ends at the U.S. Supreme Court. The military's
highest appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF), is comprised of civilian judges appointed by the president. The
accused appearing before military commissions will need a right of appeal,
and using CAAF as the first level of appellate review would strengthen the
credibility of the process.
Another cornerstone of the U.S. judicial system is the concept of
habeas corpus (i.e. seeking relief from the courts). However, Section 7
(b)(2) eliminates any such relief. A practical suggestion that would build
international and national support is to designate CAAF to review habeas
corpus issues, detention orders, and rulings that close courts from the
public, as well as act as the first level of appellate review.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The new DOD rules also need to establish the burden of proof as
beyond a reasonable doubt, the concept of innocent until proven guilty, the
right not to incriminate oneself, the right to hire defense counsel of one's
own choosing, and the right to present evidence in accordance with the
same rules that government prosecutors use. The United States should be
prepared to look to the ICTY and the ICTR for guidance. Both tribunals
allow the identity of witnesses to be withheld from the accused, less than
unanimous votes, and the protection of national intelligence used as
evidence. The standard of proof is often lower than American courts, and
the United States should make it very clear that it is modeling some of the
DOD rules on accepted international legal practice.
Hopefully, some of the suggestions and comments made throughout
this essay would strengthen the integrity and legitimacy of these
commissions and their work, as well as prevent future legal historians from
debating any perceived negative effects of military commissions on the
American justice system for years to come. These issues can, and in all
likelihood, will be alleviated by the dedicated military and civilian lawyers
who, at this writing, are hard at work developing the rules of procedure,
evidence, and administration that will apply to the military commissions.
However, until such rules are released, critics and champions alike should
pause before offering either unqualified support or condemnation.

